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RECENT DECISIONS
ntion makes no distinction between situations in which the facts not
revealed are material because of representations made and in which they
are material because of the consequences which may result from use of the
Commodity.2 3
The decision seems unfortunate, for it places a limitation on the defini-
non of false advertising which seems unwarranted, 24 frustrates the intent
of the 1938 Amendment 25 and sanctions what has been referred to as a
"commercial standard of truth."2 6
G. VERNON OWEN, JR.
DIVORCE DECREES -POWER TO VACATE AFTER TERM
Plaintiff wife filed suit for divorce but continued living with her hus-
band and even conceived a child after the filing of the petition. Having
led her husband to believe that she was not proceeding with the divorce,
plaintiff secretly obtained an uncontested divorce decree. Defendant had
a valid ground of defense by virtue of plaintiff's adultery. Plaintiff had
not disclosed to the court either the fact of her continued cohabitation with
her husband or the fact of her pregnancy, and, following the divorce decree,
she continued to live with defendant after the term in which the divorce was
granted. Defendant was then informed of the divorce, and plaintiff there-
upon married the person with whom she had committed adultery. After
term, defendant filed a petition to vacate the divorce decree on the ground
of plaintiff's fraud. On appeal, held. The trial court properly vacated
choose to advertise truthfully, they may, and should, discontinue advertising."
American Medicinal Products v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426,427 (9th Cir. 1943). Ultra-
Violet Products, Inc. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1944); Aronberg v. FTC, 132
F.2d 165 (7th Cit. 1942). The courts have not questioned the Commission's power
to order an advertiser to cease representing that his preparation will afford any more
than temporary relief to a certain condition, a more subtle method of requiring an
affirmative statement. Sebrone v. FTC, 135 F.2d 676 (7th Cit. 1943). Even
where the court modified an order by striking such a requirement, the ground was
that it might unduly harm the advertiser, and not that the Commission had no power
to make such a requirement. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cit. 1942)
In another case the court itself modified an order which modification required the
advertiser to cease and desist from representing that his product had any curative
value "except a possible slight value as a laxative." Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. FTC,
145 F.2d 976 (2nd Cir. 1944).
' See note 7 supra.
"'"It seems to me to work no hardship upon a business concern that wants to be
fair in its dealings with the public to require it so to construct the wording of its
advertisements as to describe accurately the virtues of its product." Minton, J., dis-
senting in D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942) at 683.
' See note 8 supra.
"'Some courts seem entirely too content with a 'commercial' standard of truth,
piously hoping that the purchaser will not be so gullible as to be deceived by the
depicted panaceas." Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Crotque,
1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 74, at 82 (1933).
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the divorce decree on the ground of fraud notwithstanding the fact that the
petition to vacate was filed after term.'
The court in the principal case was presented with the question of
whether a divorce decree, which was fraudulently procured, can be vacated
by a court in Ohio, after the term in which it was rendered, pursuant to a
statutory provision authorizing the vacating of judgments after term for
fraud.2 In the early case of Partsh v. Partsh,5 a bill in equity was filed to
set aside a divorce decree procured by fraud in an earlier term. The court
sustained the demurrer to the bill on the ground that a decree of divorce
was final and conclusive and could not be reviewed or set aside. The
decision was predicated upon the then existing statute which provided that
"No appeal shall be obtained from the [divorce] decree, but the same shall
be final and conclusive." The court considered this statute to be a legisla-
tive recognition of the principle of public policy that divorce decrees, which
enable the divorced parties to contract new matrimonial relations with
other innocent persons, should never be reopened. Thus, prior to 1912,
divorce decrees could not be reviewed, modified, or reversed upon appeal or
error and could not be set aside in equity or vacated after term.5 However,
in 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to provide that '"The courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or reverse the
judgments of the courts of common pleas as may be provided by
law "( This provision was interpreted by the courts to mean that divorce
decrees could be reviewed on appeal, on questions of law-i.e., error proceed-
ings 7- including questions involving the weight of the evidence.8 However,
the Supreme Court of Ohio has never reconsidered directly the power of a
1Jelm v. Jelm, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 364, 92 NE.2d 275 (Ohio App. 1950) Certiorari
was granted by the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 31, 1950. 23 Ohio Bar 221
(1950).
"'The common pleas court or the court of appeals may vacate or modify its final
order, judgment or decree after the term at which it was made 4. For fraud
practiced by the successful party in obtaining a judgment or order." OHIo GEN.
CODE § 11631(4).
'9 Ohio St. 534 (1859).
'2 CuRw. STAT. 991 (1843)
'Bay v. Bay, 85 Ohio St. 417, 98 N.E. 109 (1912); Mulligan v. Mulligan, 82 Ohio
St. 426, 92 N.E. 1120 (1910), reverstog 11 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 585, 31 Ohio C.C.
89 (1908); Epstein v. Epstein, 17 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 29, 41 Ohio C.C. 695 (1909);
Casto v. Casto, 10 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 265, 30 Ohio C.C. 93 (1907); Solomon v.
Solomon, 4 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321, 26 Ohio C.C. 307 (1904)
a Orno CONsT. Art. IV, § 6 (as amended September, 1912)
T It should be noted that in the Ohio General Code, the term "appeal on questions
of law" is construed to include all proceedings previously designated as proceedings
in error. The term "appeal on questions of law and fact" is construed to include all
proceedings previously designated as appeal. Orno GEN. CODE § 12223-1.
8 Weeden v. Weeden, 116 Ohio St. 524, 156 N.E. 908 (1927); Wells v. Wells, 105
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trial court to vacate its own divorce decrees either before or after term,
notwithstanding numerous courts of appeals decisions declaring this power
to exist.,
The court in the principal case decided that the above constitutional
amendment superseded the public policy that divorce decrees were final
and conclusive and, therefore, upheld the power to vacate such decrees.
The court did not consider the fact that even today, by statute,10 an
appeal on questions of law and fact' in divorce cases is not available. Query
whether, in view of this statute, the rule of public policy is actually no
longer existent in Ohio? However, the decision may be supported on
grounds of statutory construction, since in construing a general statute,
such as Ohio General Code Section. 11631 (4), 1 which authorizes the
vacating of judgments by the lower court after term, it is a general rule that
the court may not write in limitations or exceptions where no ambiguity
exists.' 3 The statute being general in its terms, no exception in the case
of divorce decrees should be written therein.
The power to vacate judgments in general, during term, having its origin
Ohio St. 471, 138 N.E. 7i (1922); Cox v. Cox, 104 Ohio St. 611, 136 N.E. 823
(1922); Zonars v. Zonars, 101 Ohio St. 518, 130 N.E. 943 (1920).
The statute, upon which the decision in the Parish case was based, precluded
appeal on questions of law and fact in divorce cases. The constitutional amendment,
which authorized proceedings in error as provided by law, was general in its terms.
Therefore, divorce decrees were held to be no exception to the application of such
relief. In Beck v. Beck, 48 Ohio App. 105, 109, 192 N.E. 791, 793 (1933), the
court, referring to the amendment, stated that "The people did not see fit to except
from that mandate a judgment of divorce, although they were well acquainted with
the theory of public policy and the previous sanctity of divorce decrees." Thus the
policy of according absolute finality to divorce decrees was held to be superseded by
the constitutional amendment.
'Beck v. Beck, 48 Ohio App. 105, 192 N.E. 791 (1933) (vacating after term);
Ready v. Ready, 25 Ohio App. 432, 158 N.E. 493 (1927) (vacating within term);
Ports v. Potts, 21 Oio L. Rep. 326 (1923) (vacating within term); Love v. Love,
17 Ohio App. 228 (1922) (vacating within term).
' OHio GEN. CODE § 12002: "No appeal shall be allowed from a judgment or
order of the common pleas court under this [divorce] chapter, except from an order
dismissing the petition without final hearing, or from a final order or judgment
granting or refusing alimony. When judgment is rendered for both divorce
and alimony, the appeal will lie only to so much of the judgment as relates to the
alimony. "
'See notes 7 and 8 supra.
'A similar statute, authorizing the vacating of judgment or decrees by the court
which rendered them, existed at the time of the Parish case. 51 Ohio Laws 150
(1853). However, the court in that case, being an equity court with power to set
aside judgments at law, had no occasion to look to such a statute. Although the
statute would have afforded an excellent illustration of the adequacy of the remedy
at law, the court did not consider it. Actually the issue of whether a law court may
vacate its own decree of divorce was not before this court.
' Wall v. Pfanschrmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
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in the common law, is inherent in all courts of record. 14 The great majority
of courts outside of Ohio have made no distinction between divorce judg-
ments or decrees and other judgments so far as the power to vacate is con-
cerned.' 5 The power, therefore, to vacate divorce decrees during the term
in which they are rendered is inherent in the courts, to be exercised in their
judicial discretion.' "
However, a distinction must be drawn between the power to vacate
within the term and the power to vacate after the term in which the decree
is rendered. It is a general rule that all judgments become final at the close
of the term since the interests of society demand that there be a termina-
tion to every controversy." Therefore, the inherent power of the court to
vacate its divorce judgments or decrees ceases at the close of the term'
Most courts, however, recogmze that judgments which are void, 19 or were
fraudulently procured,20 constitute exceptions to that rule, and can be
vacated by the court, after the term in which they were rendered, through
the exercise of the court's inherent power. In addition, some courts recog-
nize that the court retains inherent power to vacate the judgment, after
- 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENT § 194 (5th ed. 1925).
'E.g., Wright v. Wright, 230 Ala. 35, 159 So. 220 (1935); Wood v. Wood, 136
Iowa 128, 113 N.W 492 (1907); Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590 (1867); Smith-
son v. Smithson, 37 Neb. 535, 56 N.W 300 (1893); Wisdom v. Wisdom, 24 Neb.
551, 39 N.W 594 (1888); Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H. 388 (1872); Nichells v.
Nichells, 5 N.D. 125, 64 N.W 73 (1895); Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N.D. 343, 55 N.W
1095 (1893); State v. Watson, 20 R.I. 354, 39 Ad. 193 (1898), affd, 179 U.S.
679, 21 Sup. Ct. 915 (1900); Graham v. Graham, 54 Wash. 70, 102 Pac. 891
(1909).16lbtd.
171 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 197 (5th ed. 1925)
"Ibu.
"Regardless of statutory authority, a divorce decree which is void for want of juris-
diction over the person or subject matter can be vacated even in the absence of fraud.
Partlow v. Pardow, 246 Ala. 259, 20 So.2d-517 (1945); Lockwood v. Lockwood,
19 Ariz. 215, 168 Pac. 501 (1917); Tatum v. Tatum, 203 Ga. 406, 46 S.E.2d 915
(1948); Swift v. Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 N.W.2d 535 (1947).
'0 In any action to vacate a divorce decree for fraud, within or without term, the
fraud must be shown to have been "extrinsic or collateral" to the matter determined
in the divorce proceedings. Graham v. Graham, 251 Ala. 124, 36 So.2d 316
(1948). For a discussion of "extrinsic" as distinguished from "intrinsic" fraud,
see 2 WESTERN RESERvE L. REV. 87 (1950)
With or without statutory authority, divorce decrees have'been vacated for fraud
in the following cases: (1) Where the decree was rendered on service by publication,
and the prevailing party, to obtain such service, knowingly made a false affidavit
stating the defendant's residence to be unknown or unascertainable, and the de-
fendant received no notice. Pringle v. Pringle, 55 Wash. 93, 104 Pac. 135 (1909).
(2) Where the decree was rendered on personal service, and, due to fraud per-
petrated in the service, defendant was prevented from having due knowledge of the
suit Peterson v. Peterson, 221 Iowa 897, 267 N.W 719 (1936). (3) Where
the prevailing plaintiff intentionally kept the defendant in ignorance of the suit
[December
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term, upon the petition of both parties,21 even though such judgment is
not void or fraudulently procured. To vacate judgments or decrees after
term, for reasons other than those enumerated above, the courts require a
statutory grant of authority.
22
General statutes which authorize relief from judgments either before
or after term are by most courts construed to include divorce judgments or
decrees. 23 This construction has been applied to statutes giving a right of
action to set aside judgments procured by fraud,24 statutes permitting the
opemng of default judgments, 25 those permitting the opening of judgments
where there was a lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter,26
and those authorizing relief from judgments rendered through mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.27
through affirmative acts. Tollefson v. Tollefson, 137 Iowa 151, 114 N.W 631
(1908); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 41 Minn. 297, 43 N.W 67 (1889) (suit fraudu-
lently instituted in name of other spouse without the latter's knowledge). (4)
Where the plaintiff fraudulently induced the defendant not to defend the action.
McDonald v. McDonald, 175 Mo. App. 513, 161 S.W 850 (1913). (5) Where
the plaintiff, after commencing suit, assured the defendant that the action would not
be prosecuted, and the defendant, relying thereon, failed to defend. Womack v.
Womack, 73 Ark. 281, 83 S.W 937 (1904). (6) Where there was condonation,
of which cohabitation during the pendency of the suit is a sufficient showing. Samp-
son v. Sampson, 223 Mass. 451, 112 N.E. 84 (1916) (7) Where there was collu-
sion, according to some cases. See Jennings v. Jennings, 337 II1. App. 647, 86
N.E.2d 287 (1949). Contra: Godfrey v. Godfrey, 30 Cal. App.2d 370, 86 P.2d
357 (1939). For a discussion of the effect of collusion in an action to set aside a
decree for fraud, see 2 ALA. L. REv. 117 (1949).
Duress, generally bracketed with fraud, is a sufficient ground for vacating a
divorce decree even in the absence of fraud. Berg v. Berg, 227 Minn. 173, 34
N.W.2d 722 (1948); Lake v. Lake, 124 App. Div. 89, 108 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1908)
(threat of abandonment); Butler v. Butler, 34 Okla. 392, 125 Pac. 1127 (1912)
(threat of violence); Graham v. Graham, 54 Wash. 70, 102 Pac. 891 (1909)
(threat of suicide).
'Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 239 Pac. 1023 (1925)
2 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 197 (5th ed. 1925).
'Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N.D. 125, 64 N.W 73 (1895). Although purely equit-
able relief from a legal judgment is dearly distinguishable from the action of a law
court in vacating its own judgments, the two remedies vary in form, not substance,
and are governed by the same equitable principles. See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
§ 1186 (5th ed. 1925).
41Brockman v. Brockman, 133 Minn. 148, 157 N.W 1086 (1916); Meeker v.
Meeker, 117 Wash. 410, 201 Pac. 786 (1921).
'Schafer v. Schafer, 71 Neb. 708, 99 N.W 482 (1904); Guardia v. Guardia, 48
Nev. 230, 229 Pac. 386 (1924); Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N.D. 125, 64 N.W 73
(1895).
"Lockwood v. Lockwood, 19 Ariz. 215, 168 Pac. 501 (1917); Miller v. Miller, 37
Neb. 257, 142 Pac. 218 (1914).
'Blair v. Blair, 48 Ariz. 501, 62 P.2d 1321 (1936); Simpkins v( Simpkins, 14
Mont. 386, 36 Pac. 759 (1894); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 101 Ore. 172, 199
Pac. 385 (1921). With or without statutory authority, the court, in its discretion,
can vacate a divorce decree when the defendant was prevented from making a de-
1950].
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Although there is a natural reluctance on the part of courts to disturb
a status upon which the rights of innocent third parties may have been
founded, 28 the majority of courts have held that remarriage of the party
who obtained the decree is not in itself sufficient to end the power of a
court to vacate the decree.29 The major reason for such a holding is the
policy that the innocent husband or wife is entitled, at least, to as much
protection as the third party.30 Another reason is that a contrary rule would
make the power of the court dependent upon the acts of the party who
fraudulently procured a divorce.3' Finally, it is thought that the exercise of
such power would have the desirable effect of restraining divorced parties
from remarrying hastily while the divorce is still subject to attack and re-
versal.31
The weight of authority supports the rule that the court may still vacate
the decree, following the death of the prevailing party, if the purpose of
the vacation is to establish property rights.3
fense due to an accident, misfortune, or mistake which is unavoidable and occurs
without negligence. Smith v. Smith, 64 Cal. App.2d 415, 148 P.2d 868 (1944)
(advancement of a hearing without notification to one party); Wilson v. Wilson,
55 Cal. App.2d 421, 130 P.2d 782 (1942) (sickness); Cottrell v. Cottrell, 83 Cal.
457, 23 Pac. 531 (1890) (transfer of the suit to another forum without notice to
one party); Walrad v. Walrad, 55 Ill. App. 668 (1894) (miscarriage of mails);
Bostwick v. Bostwick, 73 Tex. 182, 11 S.W 178 (1889) (calling of trial outside
of regular order).
1 FREEMAN, JUDG MENTS § 213 (5th ed. 1925). In Carmichael v. Carmichael,
101 Ore. 172, 199 Pac. 385 (1921), the court explained that in vacating divorce
decrees the court will exercise greater caution and care for the intervening rights of
strangers.
'E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App.2d 686, 185 P.2d 49 (1947); Croyle v.
Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 40 A.2d 374 (1944); Curtis v. Curtis, 250 Mich. 105, 229
N.W 622 (1930); Cherry v. Cherry, 225 Mo. App. 998, 35 S.W.2d 659 (1931);
Wisdom v. Wisdom, 24 Neb. 551, 39 N.W 594 (1888); Bussey v. Bussey, 94 N.H.
328, 52 A.2d 856 (1947); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N.C. 685, 3 S.E.2d 5
(1939); Walker v. Walker, 151 Wash. 480, 276 Pac. 300 (1929) Contra: Bu-
shong v. Bushong, 283 Ky. 36, 140 S.W.2d 610 (1940). Even the fact of children
in the second marriage does not impair the power of the court to vacate the decree.
Medina v. Medina, 22 Colo. 146, 43 Pac. 1001 (1896). Of course, if the party
against whom the divorce was granted remarries, that party is estopped to attack the
decree. Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81 (1890)
'McConkey v. McConkey, 187 S.W 1100 (Tex. Cir. App. 1916).
1 In Fleming v. Fleming, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 554 (1924), the court indicated that
if a libelant were permitted to transform a fraudulent decree of divorce into a valid
one by the simple act of marrying again, a premium would be put on fraud and
perjury in the divorce courts.2 See Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N.D. 125, 64 N.W 73 (1895).
'Fox v. Fox, 235 Ala. 338, 179 So. 237 (1938); Britton v. Bryson, 216 Cal. 362,
14 P.2d 502 (1932); Beavers v. Bess, 58 Ind. App. 287, 108 N.E. 266 (1915);
Blair v. Blair, 96 Kan. 757, 153 Pac. 544 (1915); Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126,
40 A.2d 374 (1944).
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